![\"\"](\"http:\/\/consistent-life.org\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/02\/Blog-United-States-and-China-Flags.jpg\")
<\/a><\/p>\nWith the relationship between these two powerful countries turning increasingly tense in recent years, this anniversary seems an appropriate time for reflection. How did the resumption of relations \u2013 sometimes called the \u201copening to China\u201d \u2013 happen? How might China and the United States avoid confrontation and the risk of war in the future?<\/p>\n
Seeking a Renewed Relationship<\/strong><\/h3>\nThe 1949 Chinese revolution, in which the Communists overthrew the Nationalist regime, led to a break in US-China relations. The United States preferred to support the Nationalists, now exiled to Taiwan. The Korean War, which brought Chinese and American troops into direct conflict with each other, only deepened the nation\u2019s enmity. During the 1950s and 1960s, China and the United States had next to no diplomatic relations with each other, no direct trade or travel, and little direct knowledge of one another.<\/p>\n
American diplomats suspected of sympathies with Communist China were driven out of government or otherwise sidelined: one leading China specialist ended up as ambassador to Iceland. Meanwhile, China remained relatively isolated, having relations with only about 40 countries. That isolation deepened in the late 1960s during the internal upheaval of China\u2019s Cultural Revolution<\/a>. The Cultural Revolution led to considerable hostility toward foreigners, including foreign diplomats in China, and a scaling back of China\u2019s diplomatic presence abroad.<\/p>\nDespite their differences, China and the United States shared a common enemy in the Soviet Union. Although the Chinese had initially been allied with their fellow Communists in Moscow, Chinese-Soviet relations gradually deteriorated to a state of near-war. In 1969, Chinese and Soviet troops along the two countries\u2019 shared border began openly fighting with each other. A Soviet nuclear attack on China seemed possible. The Soviets\u2019 long-time Cold War adversary, the United States, took note.<\/p>\n
Advisers to Mao, the Communist Party Chairman, and Zhou, the Premier, suggested the time had come for an opening to the United States. Chen Yi, a former foreign minister, wrote that \u201cThe last thing the U.S. imperialists are willing to see is a victory by the Soviet revisionists in a Sino-Soviet war\u201d and that China could use \u201cthe contradiction between the United States and the Soviet Union in a strategic sense and to pursue a breakthrough\u201d (quoted in Margaret MacMillan, Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World<\/em><\/a>,<\/em> pp. 143-144).<\/p>\nSome powerful Americans were also interested in a breakthrough with China. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on pursuing a new China policy. In the late 1960s, Nixon wrote that \u201cwe simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations.\u201d Nixon\u2019s rival, the Democratic politician Hubert Humphrey, called for lifting the trade embargo on China and \u201cthe building of bridges to the people of mainland China\u201d (quoted in James Mann, About Face: A History of America\u2019s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton<\/em><\/a>, <\/em>pp. 16, 18) Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield wrote letters to Zhou asking for permission to visit China. In 1968, the State Department tried to revive talks between the American and Chinese ambassadors to Poland.<\/p>\nRelations between China and the United States gradually thawed. The United States reduced its naval activity close to China\u2019s coast, eased and eventually lifted restrictions on travel and trade between the countries, and exchanged messages with China through Pakistan. An unusual olive branch came from the Chinese in April 1971, when the Chinese government invited an American table tennis team to visit China.<\/p>\n
The historic invitation came about partly through happenstance. The Americans were participating in a competition in Tokyo along with a Chinese team. The Chinese were impressed by the American players\u2019 friendliness. When American player Glenn Cowan hitched a ride to the tournament hall on the Chinese team\u2019s bus, Chinese player Zhuang Zedong presented Cowan with a gift of a silk scarf. (Cowan later reciprocated with a gift of a red-white-and-blue shirt bearing the peace symbol and the Beatles-inspired slogan \u201cLet It Be.\u201d)<\/p>\n
![\"\"](\"http:\/\/consistent-life.org\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/02\/Zhuang-Zedong-and-Glenn-Cowan-Ping-Pong-Diplomacy-.jpg\")
<\/a>Zhuang Zedong and Glenn Cowan<\/p><\/div>\n
Back in Beijing, Mao decided to invite the American team to China, commenting \u201cZhuang Zedong not only plays good Ping-Pong but knows how to conduct diplomacy as well\u201d (MacMillan, Nixon and Mao, <\/em>p. 178). In China, the regime rolled out the red carpet for the American athletes, who became, to great international media attention, the first American delegation to visit the country since 1949.<\/p>\nAn invitation at a more official level came a few weeks later. The Chinese suggested Nixon or an envoy could come to Beijing for talks. The Nixon administration enthusiastically accepted the offer. US National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger made two trips in China in 1971 (one secret, one public) to prepare for Nixon\u2019s visit the following year.<\/p>\n
The presidential trip to China lasted a week. It included visits to Beijing, Hangzhou, and Shanghai and talks among officials on various topics, including the Soviet Union. Nixon and Mao also had one conversation<\/a>, which was limited to generalities but symbolically significant: the top leaders of two powerful and previously hostile nations were sitting down together to talk.<\/p>\nThe trip ultimately produced a joint China-US statement, known as the Shanghai Communique<\/a>. While expressing numerous disagreements between the two nations, the Communique also included the important statements that international conflicts should be resolved \u201cwithout resorting to the use or threat of force\u201d and that both nations \u201cwish to reduce the danger of international military conflict.\u201d A few years later, China and the United States established formal diplomatic relations.<\/p>\nSeeking Coexistence Today<\/strong><\/h3>\nFifty years after Nixon\u2019s trip to China, much has changed in the American-Chinese relationship. With the Soviet Union\u2019s collapse and the Cold War\u2019s end, the two countries stopped being de facto allies in that struggle. Economic ties between the two countries have grown dramatically, with the value of US-China trade<\/a> rising from roughly $4 billion in 1979 to more than $600 billion by 2017. China is today the United States\u2019 third largest trade partner. China\u2019s economy has undergone an extraordinary transformation<\/a>, from having in 1980 a GDP, as measured by the amount of goods and services a consumer can buy within their own country, that was equivalent to 10 percent of the United States\u2019, to having in 2014 a GDP equivalent to 101 percent of the United States\u2019.<\/p>\nPerhaps the most significant change is the increased hostility of recent years between China and the United States. President Biden has the United States\u2019 \u201cmost serious competitor.\u201d Possible Chinese efforts to build more<\/a> or more advanced<\/a> nuclear weapons may increase tensions with the United States. Will US-China relations become only more hostile, with war becoming a possibility? Or can relations be improved, as they were 50 years ago?<\/p>\nThe United States and China might be able to maintain a peaceful coexistence but, like the diplomatic opening of the early 1970s, realizing this goal will require considerable effort. As political scientist Graham Allison aptly put it<\/a>, American-Chinese coexistence is \u201ca chronic condition that will have to be managed over a generation \u2026 Managing this relationship without war will demand sustained attention, week by week, at the highest level in both countries.\u201d<\/p>\nBeyond requiring effort, managing the US-China relationship can\u2019t and shouldn\u2019t rely on a common enemy, as in the 1970s. Today the United States is more likely to be the target of a common alliance<\/a> between China and Russia than an ally of either one against the other. In any case, such an adversarial approach hardly promotes peace. That was the earlier approach\u2019s great flaw.<\/p>\nBoth countries must avoid falling into an arms race or a pattern of escalating aggressive actions. The United States should resist the temptation to further expand its own nuclear build-up in response to expansions in China\u2019s nuclear arsenal. The recent declaration<\/a> by several nuclear powers, including the United States and China, that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought is encouraging. The United States should consider following up on the declaration by pledging never to use nuclear weapons first<\/a> – a pledge that would align US policy with China\u2019s. To echo the Committee for a SANE US-China Policy<\/a>, both countries should also carefully coordinate and reduce their military activities in high-tension areas such as the South China Sea, to avoid potential clashes.<\/p>\nOutside government circles, continued travel, cultural exchanges, and other contact between Chinese and Americans can promote understanding between the nations. We should remember the example of \u201cping-pong diplomacy.\u201d<\/p>\n
Maintaining peaceful US-China coexistence will not be easy. The two nations made a diplomatic breakthrough in the past, though, and might yet do so again.<\/p>\n
=====================================<\/p>\n
For other similar posts by John Whitehead, see:\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\nA Cold War Comes Home? Anti-Asian Racism in Light of US-China Hostility<\/a><\/p>\n\u201cRemember Pearl Harbor\u2014Keep \u2018Em Dying\u201d: War and Racism in the Pacific<\/a><\/p>\nNo Combat Experience, No Opinion: Parallels in Pro-bombing and Pro-choice Rhetoric<\/a><\/p>\nClimate Change and the Consistent Life Ethic: An Opportunity to Connect Issues<\/a><\/p>\nThe Wages of War, Part 1: How Abortion Came to Japan<\/a><\/p>\nHard Questions about the Response to Terrorism: Looking Back on September 11th<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n
Despite their differences, China and the United States shared a common enemy in the Soviet Union. Although the Chinese had initially been allied with their fellow Communists in Moscow, Chinese-Soviet relations gradually deteriorated to a state of near-war. In 1969, Chinese and Soviet troops along the two countries\u2019 shared border began openly fighting with each other. A Soviet nuclear attack on China seemed possible. The Soviets\u2019 long-time Cold War adversary, the United States, took note.<\/p>\n
Advisers to Mao, the Communist Party Chairman, and Zhou, the Premier, suggested the time had come for an opening to the United States. Chen Yi, a former foreign minister, wrote that \u201cThe last thing the U.S. imperialists are willing to see is a victory by the Soviet revisionists in a Sino-Soviet war\u201d and that China could use \u201cthe contradiction between the United States and the Soviet Union in a strategic sense and to pursue a breakthrough\u201d (quoted in Margaret MacMillan, Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World<\/em><\/a>,<\/em> pp. 143-144).<\/p>\n Some powerful Americans were also interested in a breakthrough with China. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on pursuing a new China policy. In the late 1960s, Nixon wrote that \u201cwe simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations.\u201d Nixon\u2019s rival, the Democratic politician Hubert Humphrey, called for lifting the trade embargo on China and \u201cthe building of bridges to the people of mainland China\u201d (quoted in James Mann, About Face: A History of America\u2019s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton<\/em><\/a>, <\/em>pp. 16, 18) Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield wrote letters to Zhou asking for permission to visit China. In 1968, the State Department tried to revive talks between the American and Chinese ambassadors to Poland.<\/p>\n Relations between China and the United States gradually thawed. The United States reduced its naval activity close to China\u2019s coast, eased and eventually lifted restrictions on travel and trade between the countries, and exchanged messages with China through Pakistan. An unusual olive branch came from the Chinese in April 1971, when the Chinese government invited an American table tennis team to visit China.<\/p>\n The historic invitation came about partly through happenstance. The Americans were participating in a competition in Tokyo along with a Chinese team. The Chinese were impressed by the American players\u2019 friendliness. When American player Glenn Cowan hitched a ride to the tournament hall on the Chinese team\u2019s bus, Chinese player Zhuang Zedong presented Cowan with a gift of a silk scarf. (Cowan later reciprocated with a gift of a red-white-and-blue shirt bearing the peace symbol and the Beatles-inspired slogan \u201cLet It Be.\u201d)<\/p>\n Zhuang Zedong and Glenn Cowan<\/p><\/div>\n Back in Beijing, Mao decided to invite the American team to China, commenting \u201cZhuang Zedong not only plays good Ping-Pong but knows how to conduct diplomacy as well\u201d (MacMillan, Nixon and Mao, <\/em>p. 178). In China, the regime rolled out the red carpet for the American athletes, who became, to great international media attention, the first American delegation to visit the country since 1949.<\/p>\n An invitation at a more official level came a few weeks later. The Chinese suggested Nixon or an envoy could come to Beijing for talks. The Nixon administration enthusiastically accepted the offer. US National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger made two trips in China in 1971 (one secret, one public) to prepare for Nixon\u2019s visit the following year.<\/p>\n The presidential trip to China lasted a week. It included visits to Beijing, Hangzhou, and Shanghai and talks among officials on various topics, including the Soviet Union. Nixon and Mao also had one conversation<\/a>, which was limited to generalities but symbolically significant: the top leaders of two powerful and previously hostile nations were sitting down together to talk.<\/p>\n The trip ultimately produced a joint China-US statement, known as the Shanghai Communique<\/a>. While expressing numerous disagreements between the two nations, the Communique also included the important statements that international conflicts should be resolved \u201cwithout resorting to the use or threat of force\u201d and that both nations \u201cwish to reduce the danger of international military conflict.\u201d A few years later, China and the United States established formal diplomatic relations.<\/p>\n Fifty years after Nixon\u2019s trip to China, much has changed in the American-Chinese relationship. With the Soviet Union\u2019s collapse and the Cold War\u2019s end, the two countries stopped being de facto allies in that struggle. Economic ties between the two countries have grown dramatically, with the value of US-China trade<\/a> rising from roughly $4 billion in 1979 to more than $600 billion by 2017. China is today the United States\u2019 third largest trade partner. China\u2019s economy has undergone an extraordinary transformation<\/a>, from having in 1980 a GDP, as measured by the amount of goods and services a consumer can buy within their own country, that was equivalent to 10 percent of the United States\u2019, to having in 2014 a GDP equivalent to 101 percent of the United States\u2019.<\/p>\n Perhaps the most significant change is the increased hostility of recent years between China and the United States. President Biden has the United States\u2019 \u201cmost serious competitor.\u201d Possible Chinese efforts to build more<\/a> or more advanced<\/a> nuclear weapons may increase tensions with the United States. Will US-China relations become only more hostile, with war becoming a possibility? Or can relations be improved, as they were 50 years ago?<\/p>\n The United States and China might be able to maintain a peaceful coexistence but, like the diplomatic opening of the early 1970s, realizing this goal will require considerable effort. As political scientist Graham Allison aptly put it<\/a>, American-Chinese coexistence is \u201ca chronic condition that will have to be managed over a generation \u2026 Managing this relationship without war will demand sustained attention, week by week, at the highest level in both countries.\u201d<\/p>\n Beyond requiring effort, managing the US-China relationship can\u2019t and shouldn\u2019t rely on a common enemy, as in the 1970s. Today the United States is more likely to be the target of a common alliance<\/a> between China and Russia than an ally of either one against the other. In any case, such an adversarial approach hardly promotes peace. That was the earlier approach\u2019s great flaw.<\/p>\n Both countries must avoid falling into an arms race or a pattern of escalating aggressive actions. The United States should resist the temptation to further expand its own nuclear build-up in response to expansions in China\u2019s nuclear arsenal. The recent declaration<\/a> by several nuclear powers, including the United States and China, that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought is encouraging. The United States should consider following up on the declaration by pledging never to use nuclear weapons first<\/a> – a pledge that would align US policy with China\u2019s. To echo the Committee for a SANE US-China Policy<\/a>, both countries should also carefully coordinate and reduce their military activities in high-tension areas such as the South China Sea, to avoid potential clashes.<\/p>\n Outside government circles, continued travel, cultural exchanges, and other contact between Chinese and Americans can promote understanding between the nations. We should remember the example of \u201cping-pong diplomacy.\u201d<\/p>\n Maintaining peaceful US-China coexistence will not be easy. The two nations made a diplomatic breakthrough in the past, though, and might yet do so again.<\/p>\n =====================================<\/p>\n For other similar posts by John Whitehead, see:\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n A Cold War Comes Home? Anti-Asian Racism in Light of US-China Hostility<\/a><\/p>\n \u201cRemember Pearl Harbor\u2014Keep \u2018Em Dying\u201d: War and Racism in the Pacific<\/a><\/p>\n No Combat Experience, No Opinion: Parallels in Pro-bombing and Pro-choice Rhetoric<\/a><\/p>\n Climate Change and the Consistent Life Ethic: An Opportunity to Connect Issues<\/a><\/p>\n The Wages of War, Part 1: How Abortion Came to Japan<\/a><\/p>\n Hard Questions about the Response to Terrorism: Looking Back on September 11th<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<\/a>Seeking Coexistence Today<\/strong><\/h3>\n