In addition, we should not forget a subtler, longer-term impact of the Russia-Ukraine war. The Russian invasion of Ukraine could seriously damage the cause of nuclear nonproliferation. The current war provides fresh encouragement for nations to build or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. Even if this war ends without nuclear disaster, the world may well be living with dangerous nuclear consequences for a long time to come.<\/p>\n
Ukraine Gives Up Nuclear Weapons<\/strong><\/h3>\nUkraine today possesses no nuclear weapons and is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty<\/a>, which commits the country to not seek such weapons. However, this situation is a change from 30 years ago.<\/p>\nWhen Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union, the country was a base for Soviet nuclear weapons. At the time of the Soviet Union\u2019s collapse in 1991, 1,900 nuclear weapons remained<\/a> stationed on Ukrainian soil. Measured in sheer numbers, Ukraine had the third-largest nuclear arsenal in the world, after the United States and Russia, within its borders. This arsenal included weapons with a destructive power of 400-550 kilotons, or more than 20 times the power of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima.<\/p>\nNewly independent Ukraine\u2019s government took an ambivalent stance<\/a> toward the nuclear weapons on its territory. President Leonid Kravchuk established \u201cadministrative control\u201d over the nuclear weapons in 1992 but assured US President George H. W. Bush that Ukraine would get rid of the weapons while \u201ctaking into consideration her national security.\u201d The Ukrainian parliament, the Rada, similarly declared that the country would disarm but first required security guarantees. Ukrainian policymakers were presumably concerned about post-Soviet Russia, with which relations were tense. Meanwhile, the Bush administration wanted to reduce the number of former Soviet states with nuclear weapons to just one, Russia, perhaps out of a fear of a nuclear exchange among feuding post-Soviet states.<\/p>\nThis situation led to a long diplomatic wrangle between the United States and Ukraine. American policymakers offered assurances to the Ukrainians about their country\u2019s independence and territorial integrity being respected. However, the American policymakers would not offer their Ukrainian counterparts what the latter wanted: a legally binding guarantee that included assistance to Ukraine and automatic sanctions on an aggressor in the event of a threat to Ukraine.<\/p>\n
Ukraine, the United States, and Russia were eventually able to negotiate a settlement, which included the Budapest Memorandum<\/a> of December 9, 1994. In the Memorandum, the United States and Russia (and the United Kingdom, which was also a party to the agreement) committed \u201cto respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine\u201d and \u201cto refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine.\u201d<\/p>\nThe Memorandum contained essentially no means of enforcing this commitment, though: Russia and the United States pledged \u201cto seek immediate United Nations Security Council action to provide assistance to Ukraine\u2026 if Ukraine should become a victim of an act of aggression.\u201d Since both nations are veto-wielding permanent members of the UN Security Council, each could block any Security Council \u201caction\u201d on Ukraine\u2019s behalf.<\/p>\n
Whatever the Budapest Memorandum\u2019s shortcomings, Ukraine agreed to give up its nuclear weapons and to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty\u2014although the Rada warned that Ukraine might withdraw from the treaty if its territorial integrity were threatened. The Ukrainians began transferring their nuclear weapons to Russia and dismantling their own means for using such weapons. The last nuclear warhead left Ukraine in 1996; the last missile silo was demolished in 2001.<\/p>\n
![\"Nuclear](\"http:\/\/consistent-life.org\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/03\/blog-Nuclear-Weapons-Ukraine.jpg\")
<\/a><\/p>\nThe limitations of the Budapest Memorandum became apparent in 2014, when Russia annexed Ukraine\u2019s Crimea region and vetoed a UN Security Council resolution condemning the territory\u2019s transfer. Russia used its veto again<\/a> this February to stop a resolution condemning its current invasion of Ukraine.<\/p>\nThe terrible significance of these events for anti-nuclear activists is clear. As Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association recently commented<\/a>, \u201c[Russian President Vladimir Putin]\u2019s behavior undermines the [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] and reinforces the impression that nuclear-armed states can bully non-nuclear states, thus reducing the incentives for disarmament and making it more difficult to prevent nuclear proliferation.\u201d<\/p>\nEven before the current invasion, some Ukrainians seemed to have second thoughts<\/a> about giving up nuclear weapons. In 2014, at the time of Crimea\u2019s annexation, several Rada members proposed that Ukraine withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Others introduced a bill, which was ultimately defeated, calling for a renewal of Ukraine\u2019s nuclear status. Volodymyr Ohryzko, a former Ukrainian foreign minister, proposed that the country start producing nuclear weapons. Ohryzko commented<\/a>, \u201c[W]e have the moral and legal right to restore our nuclear status and take measures to protect ourselves independently.\u201d<\/p>\nUkrainian popular opinion became more supportive of obtaining nuclear weapons again, with almost 50 percent of survey respondents favoring this policy in 2014. More recently, Ukraine\u2019s ambassador to Germany, Andriy Melnyk, seemed to suggest<\/a> in spring 2021 that Ukraine could pursue nuclear weapons in the future\u2014although the Foreign Ministry later walked back that comment. What course Ukraine will ultimately take, like the conclusion of the present war, remains to be seen.<\/p>\nBest Option Available?<\/strong><\/h3>\nThe dangers of nuclear weapons spreading to more countries is yet another tragic result of Russia\u2019s aggression against Ukraine. Faced with such a maddening situation, the temptation is to say that the Budapest Memorandum should have provided more robust, definite guarantees to Ukraine. What such guarantees might have been is not obvious, though.<\/p>\n
Had the United States signed a legally binding treaty in 1994 promising to defend Ukraine from attack, such a treaty would have been the practical equivalent of making Ukraine part of NATO. Yet Ukrainian NATO membership has been one of the central sticking points in US-Russian relations and has arguably contributed<\/a> to the current conflict. Such a promise by the United States might have led to a conflict with Russia sooner rather than later.<\/p>\nAn American guarantee of aid to Ukraine and sanctions on Russia in the event of a Russian attack on Ukraine might have been more politically feasible in the early 1990s. However, a combination of aid and sanctions has essentially been the actual American response to Russia\u2019s 2014 and 2022 aggression against Ukraine\u2014and, as we have seen, such a response has hardly resolved the problem.<\/p>\n
The disheartening reality may be that the United States and other western nations did not have a practical way in the early 1990s of protecting a nuclear-free Ukraine from Russia. The largely symbolic Budapest Memorandum may have been the best available option. Beyond the Memorandum, the most effective way of protecting Ukraine would have been preventing the relationships among Ukraine, Russia, and the west from deteriorating to the level they reached in the 2010s. That did not happen, though, and now Ukraine and the world must deal with the consequences.<\/p>\n
Several significant events over the last 20 years have made nuclear nonproliferation and controlling nuclear weapons more difficult. One was the 2011 military intervention<\/a> by a coalition of nations, including the United States, in Libya. By leading to the overthrow of Libyan ruler Muammar Qaddafi, who had renounced his nation\u2019s nuclear weapons program in 2003, the intervention provided another strong incentive for rulers to acquire nuclear weapons and never give them up.<\/p>\nOther significant events have been the United States\u2019 withdrawal from agreements such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty<\/a> and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty<\/a>, as well Russia\u2019s apparent violations of the latter treaty. Russia\u2019s attacks on Ukraine, in violation of the Budapest Memorandum, are yet more episodes in this lamentable pattern.<\/p>\nThe two nations with the world\u2019s largest nuclear arsenals have predictably proven to be among the most significant obstacles to reducing the nuclear threat.<\/p>\n
![\"Nukes](\"http:\/\/consistent-life.org\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/03\/March-no-nukes.jpg\")
<\/a><\/p>\n===============================<\/p>\n
For more of our posts on Ukraine, see:\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\nNot Your Pawns: A CLE Examination of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict<\/a><\/p>\nA Catastrophe Decades in the Making: The Russian Invasion of Ukraine<\/a><\/p>\n <\/p>\n
For more of our posts on nuclear weapons, see:\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\nNukes and the Pro-Life Christian<\/a>: A Conservative Takes a Second Look at the Morality of Nuclear Weapons<\/p>\nThe Reynolds Family, the Nuclear Age and a Brave Wooden Boat<\/a> “An Inferno That <\/a><\/p>\nEven the Mind of Dante Could Not Envision\u201d: Martin Luther King on Nuclear Weapons<\/a><\/p>\nNuclear Disarmament as a Social Justice Issue<\/a><\/p>\nA Global Effort to Protect Life: The UN Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons<\/a><\/p>\n <\/p>\n
When Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union, the country was a base for Soviet nuclear weapons. At the time of the Soviet Union\u2019s collapse in 1991, 1,900 nuclear weapons remained<\/a> stationed on Ukrainian soil. Measured in sheer numbers, Ukraine had the third-largest nuclear arsenal in the world, after the United States and Russia, within its borders. This arsenal included weapons with a destructive power of 400-550 kilotons, or more than 20 times the power of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima.<\/p>\n Newly independent Ukraine\u2019s government took an ambivalent stance<\/a> toward the nuclear weapons on its territory. President Leonid Kravchuk established \u201cadministrative control\u201d over the nuclear weapons in 1992 but assured US President George H. W. Bush that Ukraine would get rid of the weapons while \u201ctaking into consideration her national security.\u201d The Ukrainian parliament, the Rada, similarly declared that the country would disarm but first required security guarantees. Ukrainian policymakers were presumably concerned about post-Soviet Russia, with which relations were tense. Meanwhile, the Bush administration wanted to reduce the number of former Soviet states with nuclear weapons to just one, Russia, perhaps out of a fear of a nuclear exchange among feuding post-Soviet states.<\/p>\n This situation led to a long diplomatic wrangle between the United States and Ukraine. American policymakers offered assurances to the Ukrainians about their country\u2019s independence and territorial integrity being respected. However, the American policymakers would not offer their Ukrainian counterparts what the latter wanted: a legally binding guarantee that included assistance to Ukraine and automatic sanctions on an aggressor in the event of a threat to Ukraine.<\/p>\n Ukraine, the United States, and Russia were eventually able to negotiate a settlement, which included the Budapest Memorandum<\/a> of December 9, 1994. In the Memorandum, the United States and Russia (and the United Kingdom, which was also a party to the agreement) committed \u201cto respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine\u201d and \u201cto refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine.\u201d<\/p>\n The Memorandum contained essentially no means of enforcing this commitment, though: Russia and the United States pledged \u201cto seek immediate United Nations Security Council action to provide assistance to Ukraine\u2026 if Ukraine should become a victim of an act of aggression.\u201d Since both nations are veto-wielding permanent members of the UN Security Council, each could block any Security Council \u201caction\u201d on Ukraine\u2019s behalf.<\/p>\n Whatever the Budapest Memorandum\u2019s shortcomings, Ukraine agreed to give up its nuclear weapons and to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty\u2014although the Rada warned that Ukraine might withdraw from the treaty if its territorial integrity were threatened. The Ukrainians began transferring their nuclear weapons to Russia and dismantling their own means for using such weapons. The last nuclear warhead left Ukraine in 1996; the last missile silo was demolished in 2001.<\/p>\n The limitations of the Budapest Memorandum became apparent in 2014, when Russia annexed Ukraine\u2019s Crimea region and vetoed a UN Security Council resolution condemning the territory\u2019s transfer. Russia used its veto again<\/a> this February to stop a resolution condemning its current invasion of Ukraine.<\/p>\n The terrible significance of these events for anti-nuclear activists is clear. As Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association recently commented<\/a>, \u201c[Russian President Vladimir Putin]\u2019s behavior undermines the [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] and reinforces the impression that nuclear-armed states can bully non-nuclear states, thus reducing the incentives for disarmament and making it more difficult to prevent nuclear proliferation.\u201d<\/p>\n Even before the current invasion, some Ukrainians seemed to have second thoughts<\/a> about giving up nuclear weapons. In 2014, at the time of Crimea\u2019s annexation, several Rada members proposed that Ukraine withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Others introduced a bill, which was ultimately defeated, calling for a renewal of Ukraine\u2019s nuclear status. Volodymyr Ohryzko, a former Ukrainian foreign minister, proposed that the country start producing nuclear weapons. Ohryzko commented<\/a>, \u201c[W]e have the moral and legal right to restore our nuclear status and take measures to protect ourselves independently.\u201d<\/p>\n Ukrainian popular opinion became more supportive of obtaining nuclear weapons again, with almost 50 percent of survey respondents favoring this policy in 2014. More recently, Ukraine\u2019s ambassador to Germany, Andriy Melnyk, seemed to suggest<\/a> in spring 2021 that Ukraine could pursue nuclear weapons in the future\u2014although the Foreign Ministry later walked back that comment. What course Ukraine will ultimately take, like the conclusion of the present war, remains to be seen.<\/p>\n The dangers of nuclear weapons spreading to more countries is yet another tragic result of Russia\u2019s aggression against Ukraine. Faced with such a maddening situation, the temptation is to say that the Budapest Memorandum should have provided more robust, definite guarantees to Ukraine. What such guarantees might have been is not obvious, though.<\/p>\n Had the United States signed a legally binding treaty in 1994 promising to defend Ukraine from attack, such a treaty would have been the practical equivalent of making Ukraine part of NATO. Yet Ukrainian NATO membership has been one of the central sticking points in US-Russian relations and has arguably contributed<\/a> to the current conflict. Such a promise by the United States might have led to a conflict with Russia sooner rather than later.<\/p>\n An American guarantee of aid to Ukraine and sanctions on Russia in the event of a Russian attack on Ukraine might have been more politically feasible in the early 1990s. However, a combination of aid and sanctions has essentially been the actual American response to Russia\u2019s 2014 and 2022 aggression against Ukraine\u2014and, as we have seen, such a response has hardly resolved the problem.<\/p>\n The disheartening reality may be that the United States and other western nations did not have a practical way in the early 1990s of protecting a nuclear-free Ukraine from Russia. The largely symbolic Budapest Memorandum may have been the best available option. Beyond the Memorandum, the most effective way of protecting Ukraine would have been preventing the relationships among Ukraine, Russia, and the west from deteriorating to the level they reached in the 2010s. That did not happen, though, and now Ukraine and the world must deal with the consequences.<\/p>\n Several significant events over the last 20 years have made nuclear nonproliferation and controlling nuclear weapons more difficult. One was the 2011 military intervention<\/a> by a coalition of nations, including the United States, in Libya. By leading to the overthrow of Libyan ruler Muammar Qaddafi, who had renounced his nation\u2019s nuclear weapons program in 2003, the intervention provided another strong incentive for rulers to acquire nuclear weapons and never give them up.<\/p>\n Other significant events have been the United States\u2019 withdrawal from agreements such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty<\/a> and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty<\/a>, as well Russia\u2019s apparent violations of the latter treaty. Russia\u2019s attacks on Ukraine, in violation of the Budapest Memorandum, are yet more episodes in this lamentable pattern.<\/p>\n The two nations with the world\u2019s largest nuclear arsenals have predictably proven to be among the most significant obstacles to reducing the nuclear threat.<\/p>\n ===============================<\/p>\n For more of our posts on Ukraine, see:\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n Not Your Pawns: A CLE Examination of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict<\/a><\/p>\n A Catastrophe Decades in the Making: The Russian Invasion of Ukraine<\/a><\/p>\n <\/p>\n For more of our posts on nuclear weapons, see:\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n Nukes and the Pro-Life Christian<\/a>: A Conservative Takes a Second Look at the Morality of Nuclear Weapons<\/p>\n The Reynolds Family, the Nuclear Age and a Brave Wooden Boat<\/a> “An Inferno That <\/a><\/p>\n Even the Mind of Dante Could Not Envision\u201d: Martin Luther King on Nuclear Weapons<\/a><\/p>\n Nuclear Disarmament as a Social Justice Issue<\/a><\/p>\n A Global Effort to Protect Life: The UN Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons<\/a><\/p>\n <\/p>\n<\/a><\/p>\nBest Option Available?<\/strong><\/h3>\n
<\/a><\/p>\n