Spice things up with the Consistent Life Ethic

Carol Crossed
By Carol Crossed, Consistent Life Board Member
The consistent life ethic is like salt. You don’t need a whole lot to be effective. But it’s essential to have it present…spread out here and there to spice up politics, to add a little flavor to dull single-issue groups.
But it stings, like when you wash out your mouth to cure a canker sore. It smarts on the wound. It makes you sit up straight and take notice that something’s different here. And then it heals if you leave it there long enough. The “liberals” need it to cure contradictions and the “conservatives” need it for incongruities. And we all need it to cleanse and purify us from self-righteousness. Yes, consistency is good for what ails the Left and the Right.
Salt forms new compositions and breaks up ice. Like the consistent life ethic it warms cold and hardened opinions and makes slush…soft and malleable. The fragile unborn child becomes the person on death row. We abandon our stale ideologies that leave somebody out. The homeless on the war torn streets of Baghdad become the homeless unwanted child in the womb. Home. That’s where the consistent life ethic brings us. No hidden agendas. It allows us to be whole, to be ourselves again.
Originally published in Harmony, December 1991
The Consistent Life Consensus in Ancient Christianity
by Rob Arner, CL Board member
Adjunct Professor of Religion at Reformed Episcopal Seminary and Chestnut Hill College, Philadelphia, PA
When measured against the standard of the ancient Christian church, contemporary American and European Christianity is in a moral mess. When it comes to what have been called the “life issues,” Christians are no less sharply divided than members of secular society. Some Christians, called “conservative” by conventional narratives, believe abortion is a grave moral evil. Yet often these same Christians will fall in line to support the latest war proposed by the nation’s chief executive. Other Christians tend not to view abortion as such an intrinsic evil, but rather a tragic “choice” for mothers in difficult circumstances. These Christians, sometimes called “liberal,” are more concerned with systemic and social evils, such as poverty, and are critical of the ready recourse to war. These two groups far too often find themselves talking past one another at best, and actively working against one another at worst, so significant progress isn’t made toward addressing either group’s moral concerns.
But imagine if this were not so. Imagine the impact if there were instead a united witness, an ecumenical consensus surrounding the thorny question of whether and in what circumstances a disciple of Jesus might take a human life.
Such a consensus actually existed in the ancient Christian church, stretching from the time of the apostles until the Christianization of the Roman Empire with the conversion of the emperor Constantine.
In my investigation into the ethics of the ancient Christian church, I read every surviving orthodox Christian sermon, treatise, letter, and apology from that period (about 90-314 C.E.) and discovered a startling consensus on this issue. As diverse as the ancient Christian church may have been on wealth and poverty, sexuality, church governance, theology, and a host of other issues, when it comes to the subject of killing other human persons, the ancient Christian writers were startlingly in accord with one another. Without exception, the church strongly condemned the taking of human life in any form whatsoever.
Neither homicide, nor feticide, nor infanticide, nor suicide, nor capital punishment, nor killing in war were considered acceptable. Put more precisely, no surviving orthodox Christian writing dating from before Constantine ever approves of Christian participation in human bloodshed.
In the Roman Empire, life was cheap. Not only was the “peace” of the empire secured and maintained through brutal conquest, but everyday life for Roman citizens, even during times of “peace,” was filled with violence. Killing was sport in the gladiatorial conquests and chariot races.
The value of individual human persons was deemed subordinate to the good of Rome. This was true at both the upper levels of society — witness how many Roman emperors met with violent deaths at the hands of their rivals (or loved ones!) — as well as at the bottom strata, as the life of a slave was all but worthless to his or her master, and unwanted children of the poor were either aborted or abandoned in the countryside to die of exposure. The glory of Rome was built on the broken backs of enslaved peoples and the blood of those deemed expendable. It’s into this milieu the ancient church brought its message that was decidedly on the side of life— in every case.
Both abortions of unborn children and the killings of unwanted or disabled born children were widely practiced in ancient Rome. The early Christians stood forcefully against these practices. For instance, the ancient discipleship manual commonly known as the Didache, which dates from around the turn of the second century CE, and therefore may actually have been written at the same time as some of the New Testament, contains an explicit prohibition of infanticide and abortion: “A further commandment of the Teaching: Do not murder; do not commit adultery; do not practice pederasty; do not fornicate; do not steal; do not deal in magic; do not practice sorcery; do not kill a fetus by abortion, or commit infanticide” (Didache 2.1–2).
Another explicit statement:
But with us, murder is forbidden once for all. We are not permitted to destroy even the fetus in the womb, as long as blood is still being drawn to form a human being. To prevent the birth of a child is a quicker way to murder. It makes no difference whether one destroys a soul already born or interferes with its coming to birth. It is a human being and one who is to be [an adult], for the whole fruit is already present in the seed. (Tertullian, Apology, 9)
Just as with “private” issues of abortion and infanticide, the early church offered an adamant “no” on the most “public” kinds of killing. The early Christian discussions on killing in war, and on military service more broadly, are so numerous and multifaceted that I can only scratch the surface.
The church’s broad condemnation of killing made the military profession deeply problematic. In the Apostolic Tradition, how the church prepared new initiates for baptism:
(9.) A soldier in command must be told not to kill people; if he is ordered so to do, he shall not carry it out. Nor shall he take the oath. If he will not agree, he should be rejected [from the baptism preparation].
(10.) Anyone who has the power of the sword, or who is a civil magistrate wearing the purple, should desist, or he should be rejected.
(11.) If a catechumen or a believer wishes to become a soldier they should be rejected, for they have despised God. (Apostolic Tradition, 16.9–11)
For many soldiers, quitting the army before their terms expired would entail an almost certain death sentence. Therefore, those who were already soldiers at the time of their conversion could stay in their posts as long as they did not swear the military oath or kill anyone.
Military imagery of discipline and order was converted to positive imagery of peace, as in this example:
But when the shrilling trumpet blows, it assembles the soldiers and proclaims war; and shall not Christ, think you, having breathed to the ends of the earth a song of peace, assemble the soldiers of peace that are his? Yes, and He did assemble, O man, by blood and by word His bloodless army, and to them He entrusted the kingdom of heaven. (Exhortation to the Greeks, 11)
Numerous ancient Christian writers go on record as opposing all killing period. Their words express a strict ethic that was pervasive across the church of that era, not just isolated to one city or region. Origen, for example, said of Jesus:
He taught that it was never right for his disciples to go so far against a man, even if he should be very wicked; for he did not consider it compatible with his inspired legislation to allow the taking of human life in any form at all. (Against Celsus, 3.7)
Lactantius wrote:
So, neither will it be permitted a just man, whose service is justice herself, to enter military service, nor can he accuse anyone of a capital crime, because there is no difference whether you kill a man with a sword or a word, since the killing itself is prohibited. Therefore, in this command of God, no exception whatsoever must be made. It is always wrong to kill a man whom God has intended to be a sacrosanct creature. (Lactantius, Divine Institutes 6.20)
The church before Constantine consistently rejected killing—whether in the womb, in the arena, on the battlefield, or anywhere else.
Might this ethical and moral clarity be relevant today, in our time of polarizing culture wars? Might it have the power to bridge the gap between “conservatives” and the life-issues dear to their hearts, and “liberal/progressives” and the peace and justice issues dear to theirs?
I submit that the way of Jesus Christ as lived by the early Christian church is decidedly a “third-way” that defies these two conventional categories and has tremendous potential for healing a broken world by uniting ideological opponents in common cause with one another— to work alongside, rather than against one another. At this hour of history, it may be the most effective and necessary means by which we can become ambassadors of reconciliation and protect the vulnerable persons in our world today.
Editor’s note: For a book-length version and extensive documentation of this thesis, see
Consistently Pro-Life: The Ethics of Bloodshed in Ancient Christianity.
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For more blog posts on the history of the consistent life ethic, see:
First Stirrings in Connecting the Life Issues
Ancient Roots of the Consistent Life Ethic: Greece
The Adventures of Prolifers for Survival: Scorned by Mobilization for Survival
Reminiscing on the Founding Meeting of the Consistent Life Network
Nukes and the Pro-Life Christian: A Conservative Takes a Second Look at the Morality of Nuclear Weapons
By Karen Swallow Prior
from Sojourners, August 2015
I WAS SITTING IN the wrong end of a police wagon the first time I questioned nuclear weapons. Technically, it was a school bus, but it served the same purpose: hauling scores of protesters to the county holding center where we would await booking for our trespasses.
We had been protesting abortion. I was thinking about nuclear weapons because a couple of those in the bus were peace activists who had long rap sheets from years of anti-war protests. I, on the other hand, was a Republican-voting, independent Baptist church-attending, conservative-leaning, law-abiding (well, until now) kind of Christian. I was awed—and grateful—that these peaceniks would join the likes of me in common cause against another kind of violence.
My new friends adhered to the “seamless garment” philosophy, also called the consistent life ethic, one committed to the protection of all human life, whether from war, poverty, racism, capital punishment, euthanasia, or abortion. One of them gave me a button that read “Peace begins in the womb,” and I pinned it to the bottom of the black leather motorcycle jacket I used to wear in those days.
A few years and many more abortion protests later, I was starting a local chapter of Feminists for Life, attending an Episcopal church, heading up a small private school in the inner city, teaching at a Jesuit college, and reading the poetry of Father Daniel Berrigan, the famous Vietnam-era anti-war activist who was now being arrested for protesting abortion.
– See more at: https://sojo.net/magazine/august-2015/nukes-and-pro-life-christian#sthash.URc7MaLr.dpuf

Karen Swallow Prior, a professor of English at Liberty University in Lynchburg, Va., is the author most recently of Fierce Convictions: The Extraordinary Life of Hannah More: Poet, Reformer, Abolitionist and a research fellow with the Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention. She is also a Consistent Life endorser.
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Another blog post on a conservative look at issues of violence:
Why Conservatives Should Oppose the Death Penalty
For more blog posts on personal journeys, see:
Supporting the Dignity of Every Life (Bill Samuel)
Coming to Peace and Living a Consistent Life After Military Service
Off the Fence and Taking My Stand on Abortion (Mary Liepold)
Sharon Long: My Personal Pro-life Journey
On Being a Consistent Chimera (Rob Arner)
The Myth of Sexual Autonomy
by Julianne Wiley
Note: Julianne Wiley (aka Juli Loesch) was the founder of Prolifers for Survival, the predecessor group of Consistent Life (CL). This is an updated version of an article published in the Spring 1987 version of Sisterlife, then newsletter of CL member group Feminists for Life.
Occasionally on the web we find abortion defenders compelled to admit that the Left and the media are more likely to be won over by the “seamless garment” approach, which includes opposition to abortion in the context of opposition to other kinds of sanctioned killing. Or that prolife feminists have grasped some “essential feminist truths” which make their arguments against abortion more compelling.
With the game beginning to go against them, some will fold the rest of their hand and slap their highest card on the table: sexual autonomy.
No matter what else happens, and no matter what “utopian” changes may come, there will always be the vagaries of sexual passion and the failures of contraception. Thus, come what may, abortion will always be “necessary” if we are to be free to live “sexually autonomous” lives.
Ellen Willis in the Village Voice hurled the following challenge: “I have yet to hear any right-to-lifers take full responsibility for that fact or deal seriously with its political implications.”
On the contrary. I think that it’s the advocates of sexual autonomy who have failed to recognize its political implications.
The opposite of sexual autonomy, or independence, is sexual bondedness, or interdependence. What the autonomous wish to enjoy is precisely unbondedness; and one of the bonds to be rejected is a bond to offspring who were conceived without deliberate choice.
To the defenders of such autonomy I would like to post these questions: Is there such a thing as parental obligation? If so, when and how, and for whom, does this obligation arise?
In the past, people assumed that simply by engaging in heterosexual relations with each other they acquired parental obligations if and when pregnancy resulted. But now, this is to be seen as a denial of sexual autonomy. Obligations now arise, not from the decision to have sex, but from the strictly separate decision to bear the child.
But please note: The decision to have sex is a decision made by both partners. The decision to bear the child is made by only one of them: namely, the woman.
Thus, the woman’s responsibility corresponds to her choice, made at some point during the pregnancy. If she doesn’t want to assume any obligation, she can choose abortion and any question of parental responsibility is foreclosed.
But for the man, parental obligation supposedly arises from the woman’s choices: her choice to bear the baby, and her choice to name him as the father and even to bring legal action to compel his support, if it comes to that.
The problem here is obvious. You can expect increasingly to hear the sexually autonomous male’s just complaint: “How is it that she gets a choice, but I don’t? She chose to be a mother. I didn’t choose to be a father. I just chose to have sex!”
There will always be men who, at any given moment, want sex but don’t want a child; some of these men will get women pregnant. But sexual intercourse now implies for each of them – exactly nothing, no responsibility.
It’s only the woman’s subsequent and separate option that determines everything. That being the case, why should any man feel he’s acquired an obligation if the woman decides to give birth? Because he deposited sperm in the woman’s vagina? Don’t be medieval.
Am I predicting that the elevation of sexual autonomy to the status of a “right,” coupled with the availability of abortion, will cut men loose entirely? That paternal responsibility will sink to zero? That men are not only going to take off, but feel justified about it?
Hell, no. I’m not predicting that. I’m reporting it. I’ve done my share of women’s shelter work. I saw it all the time. A couple has a child. Three years down the line he decides he isn’t cut out to be a father. “But you can’t just walk out. This is your child too!”
“Sure, sure. But it was your choice.”
Well, the gentleman is right, given that the availability of abortion has made procreation a unilateral female decision.
Most male commitment to the long-term responsibility of child rearing is not obtained through court order. It is obtained voluntarily through a man’s sense, bolstered by society, that it’s right and fair. Why? Because the choice that obliges both him and the woman is the choice they made together, in the act that made the child.
The vast majority of women and children in this world rely upon webs of interrelation predicated upon a sexually connected man: a man whose sexuality makes him the husband of this woman, the father of this child. It’s sex that binds him, obliges him to another gender and another generation.
If the act of generation loses this weight, this significance—and the abortion culture simply blows it away—then you end up with fathering that never makes a father, mating that never makes a mate, short-circuited sex that dreams of nothing more than being plugged into its own sockets.
Autonomy—in this sense—is as pro-woman as poverty and as pro-sex as an amputation. And abortion—the dismembered offspring—is not only its program, but its most perfect and fitting image.
Does the Consistent Life Ethic Water Down Life Issues?
Some say the consistent life ethic (CLE) waters down a particular life issue. The harsher critics state, or at least imply, that this is deliberate. This kind of criticism is not new, but this year I’ve been seeing it more than I usually do.
While some may be insincere about their support of the CLE, we believe a genuine commitment to the CLE strengthens work on each issue. Our Purpose Statement states “We serve the anti-violence community by connecting issues, building bridges, and strengthening the case against each kind of socially-approved killing by consistently opposing them all.” And this synergy among issues works.
People who aren’t convinced on one of the issues often tell us that they respect our position because we are consistent. They are more willing to listen to why the unborn should be protected because we also oppose the death penalty and war, or listen to our arguments against war because we also favor protection of the unborn. They may be much less willing to listen to those not committed to other life issues.
Some people mistakenly believe that we oppose focus on a single issue. In fact, we believe there is a need for some individuals and groups to focus on a particular issue. Some of our member groups focus on one issue, or perhaps on two. They join Consistent Life because they see their work in the broader CLE context. We don’t want to water down the work of any of these groups. We are an inclusive network that encourages and promotes the anti-violence activities of all our group and individual members, working together, each in their own way, to make a difference.
Bill Samuel has served as President of Consistent Life since 2005.
Rejecting Mass Murder: Looking Back on Hiroshima and Nagasaki
By John Whitehead, Secretary of Consistent Life
The United States devastated the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on, respectively, August 6th and 9th, 1945, in what were—to date—the only occasions in history that atomic bombs were used in wartime. The atomic bombings killed tens of thousands of people instantly, with many more dying of injuries in the following hours, days, and weeks—by the end of 1945, an estimated 210,000 people had perished as a result of the bombings. Because the use of atomic bombs against these two cities contributed to the surrender of Japan and the end of the Second World War, many have argued that the bombings saved lives that would otherwise have been lost in continued warfare and thus that bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki was justified. For adherents to a consistent ethic of life, however, these uses of atomic bombs were not justified—they amounted simply to mass murder.
Those who advocate a consistent ethic of life vary in their precise attitudes toward war. Some are pacifists who regard all killing in war as inherently wrong. For these pacifists, destroying a city with an atomic bomb must be rejected in the same way that any killing must be.
Other consistent ethic of life advocates are not absolutist in their opposition to war but adhere to Just War Theory or other ethical philosophies that allow that killing in war could be justified, at least under certain circumstances. For these non-pacifists, the reasons for rejecting the use of atomic bombs against cities are less straight-forward than they are for pacifists. Even viewed from such non-absolutist consistent ethic of life perspectives, however, the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is difficult to justify, for two reasons.
First, violent means to achieve an end cannot be justified if nonviolent means can achieve the same end. Just War Theory acknowledges this basic principle by requiring that war must be a last resort in order to be justified. In 1945, the end pursued by the United States and other Allied powers—the surrender of their wartime enemy, Japan—could have been achieved by diplomatic means without resorting to the threatened or actual use of atomic bombs against the Japanese.
A major obstacle in bringing the war with Japan to an end through negotiation was the Allied insistence, expressed in the Cairo Declaration of 1943 and Potsdam Declaration of 1945, that Japan surrender unconditionally. Such insistence left the Japanese uncertain about what the fate would be of the Emperor Hirohito, the Japanese head of state who held divine status in the eyes of many Japanese. The Allied Potsdam Declaration, which promised that “stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals” even left open the possibility that Hirohito might be executed or imprisoned by the victorious Allied powers.
Such a possibility was unacceptable to the Japanese government. Indeed, so unacceptable were threats to the emperor and his position that even after atomic bombs had devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Japanese government was willing to come to surrender terms, wholly unconditional surrender was out of the question. To the very end, Japan’s rulers insisted that Hirohito remain sovereign, and the war only came to an end when it did because the United States was willing to relent and allow Hirohito to stay, at least provisionally. Had the Allies relented on this point sooner, the war might have been brought to a successful conclusion without atomic bombs ever being used.
Even if such diplomatic means of ending the war had not been available, however, the atomic bombings would still not have been justified, for a second and ultimately far more important reason.
A fundamental principle of Just War Theory—and one that even those who do not wholly endorse Just War Theory can appreciate—is that military forces should discriminate between enemy military personnel and enemy civilians when using violence. Enemy citizens who by their status as members of the armed forces are authorized and prepared to use lethal violence in wartime may be reciprocally regarded as legitimate targets of such violence; enemy citizens who are not in the armed forces and are not authorized to play such a violent role are not legitimate targets.
Granted (to echo a point made by Just War theorist Michael Walzer), the line that divides military personnel and civilians can be difficult to draw. Some enemy citizens may belong to military reserves or militias that act as auxiliaries to regular military forces; other citizens work in industries that produce weapons and thereby contribute, at least indirectly, to violence. Nevertheless (again echoing Walzer), some enemy citizens will always fall into categories that place them clearly outside the military realm: children (both inside and outside the womb), the elderly, and the sick and disabled. Further, I would argue that other classes of people who might serve in military capacities but perform clearly nonviolent functions—doctors and nurses, clergy—also fall into the protected category of civilians.
To target these clearly inoffensive, non-military people is unjust. Such people were targeted in the devastations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and did perish as a result. Using a weapon of such overwhelming destructive power as an atomic bomb against an entire city inevitably involves targeting people who should be protected from violence, even in wartime.
In addition to the pacifist and Just War reasons given above, consistent ethic of life advocates have one more important reason for rejecting the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings—and any similar slaughter of civilians. The essential argument made by defenders of the bombings—killing huge numbers of people, including children, ultimately achieved the worthwhile goal of ending the Second World War—can be invoked to justify other forms of violence, including abortion. Don’t worthwhile goals (so the argument would go) such as gender equality, curbing overpopulation, reducing poverty and crime, or preventing child abuse justify the deaths of countless unborn children?
Consistent ethic of life advocates know better than to accept such toxic rationales, whether in the realm of abortion or warfare.
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For another of our blog posts about nuclear weapons, see:
An Open Letter to Fellow Human Rights Activists
From Richard Stith J.D.(Yale), Ph.D.(Yale), Professor of Law Emeritus & Consistent Life Board Member
I think any endorsement of abortion rights to be a mistake, for two reasons: Endorsing abortion rights causes further harm to already oppressed women, particularly in the developing world. And endorsing abortion rights hurts our important work for human rights in general.
(1) If a woman is dominated by others, the freedoms she is given will be exercised against her by those who dominate her.
We all know that many women are simply unable to effectively negotiate the terms and conditions of their sexual interactions and reproductive choices due to pervasive discrimination, coercion and violence against them. Unfortunately, legalization of abortion provides those coercers with another weapon that they can use against the women they dominate.
In other words, abortion rights may truly be liberating for powerful women whose careers cannot easily accommodate children, for women who are truly free to choose without outside pressures and for whom the opportunity costs of children are very great. Polls indeed show that such women overwhelmingly support a right to abortion. By contrast, poorer women, even in the USA, are the group most hostile to abortion. Why would they want abortion available if it’s only going to result in a boyfriend, a parent, a husband, or an employer coercing them (even by violence) to forego one of the few satisfactions they have in their oppressed lives, the love of a child? Or just think how the availability of abortion can facilitate raw sexual exploitation: A college student told me once: “I’m really pro-choice, but you can bet I tell my boyfriend I’m 100% pro-life.” She knew that the option of abortion could easily make him less careful. But not all young women are so clever. (Consult the great feminist thinker Catherine MacKinnon for more on the effect of making abortion a “privacy” right. She points out that it is precisely in women’s private lives that male dominance is most extreme.)
The developing world is much, much worse for most women. Except for a tiny elite segment of women (which unfortunately may be the only non-male presence at international conferences set up to propose new laws) abortion hurts women because it empowers husbands, sweatshop owners, and pimps to use them with impunity. The rule is very simple: Those who make real life choices for women are the real rights holders, regardless of who may have the formal legal right to make decisions.
Even seemingly obvious rights to abortion, such as abortion after rape or incest, may backfire against women where they are weak. After all, in most societies rape and incest are viewed very negatively, if they are discovered. Male predators ordinarily want their victims to have abortions so they won’t be exposed and punished, and so that they can continue their sexual exploitation. Only in a modern nation, with a good police force, can predators regularly be caught and punished, so that the abortion decision can more truly be that of the woman. This is a tough call I admit, but the uncertainty of the real-life impact of laws permitting abortion should give one second thoughts about making even abortion after rape into an international right, applicable in all circumstances in all countries.
In summary, to proclaim rights to abortion around the world is to adopt a first-world, or an upper-elite, view of the beneficiaries of such rights. A down-to-earth look at poor and oppressed women’s actual lives will lead one to conclude that women would first need to be empowered before they could truly benefit from any rights to abortion.
2) No organization can proclaim complete support for Human Rights if it endorses abortion.
As a teacher of comparative law, I can tell you the right to life of the fetus is explicitly protected by a number of international treaties and national constitutions. Fundamental rights to abortion are recognized far less extensively.
I’m not saying that only a few nations permit abortion. Many do. But very few treat it as a basic human right. Abortion is permitted simply because the legislature of the nation has decided to pass such a law, but that law could be repealed tomorrow without violating any treaty or constitution. Nowhere in Europe (with the possible exception of abortion for severe health reasons in Italy) is there a clear constitutional right to abortion, to my knowledge. But various countries’ constitutions or constitutional court decisions contain a right to life. Germany is one. The unborn child has a constitutional right to life throughout pregnancy there, recognized twice by the Constitutional Court in lengthy decisions in 1975 and in 1993. [Do not rely on the over-simplified report that Germany does not punish abortion in the first 12 weeks, as long as the pregnant woman has undergone solidly “pro-life” counseling and has waited three more days to think it over. That is true, but the Court’s reasoning is that the counseling will save more unborn lives than threats of punishment. Strange as it may seem to us, abortion goes unpunished in Germany in furtherance of a fetal right to life, not of a maternal right to abortion.] And why does Germany care about unborn life? The answer given by the Court is that to permit abortion is to head once again down the path to devaluation of individual human life followed by the Nazis. When we proclaim a right to abortion, according to German human rights doctrine, we are attacking life, the most basic human right of all, and following again that dreaded path.
The regional human rights treaty for the Americas, the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José, 1969) explicitly proclaims “Every person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception.” [Art. 4(1)]. It also emphasizes that “’person’ means every human being.” [Art. 1(2)] Thus we see that the unborn child is recognized as a person with a right to life from the moment of conception. When it comes to legal protection of that right, it is true, the signatory states have a little flexibility (presumably to deal with any clash with the mother’s equal right to life) because of the words “in general.” But this is not phrased as a limit on the right itself, but only as a permitted (but not required) minor exception to the legal enforcement of that right. Do we really want to proclaim a right to violate the core of a major human rights treaty? Does it want to have to say from now on: “We’re for many recognized human rights, but we’re opposed to others”? [A recent American human rights court decision twisted the above words to escape their impact, but please remember that court decisions are not binding precedents in Latin America. The words of the Treaty remain the law, despite the contrary court decision.]
It is true that the Protocol to the African Charter endorses a very limited right to abortion—the first such treaty right in the world. This is quite ironic, however, since black Africa may be the most anti-abortion part of the globe. A Pew poll, for example, found that 64% of Nigerians and a whopping 81% of Kenyans said women should be stopped from having abortions (USA: only 32%, according to Pew). How much does that Protocol represent the African peoples as opposed to representing NGOs and other elites? Do we want to be part of what may well be a shoving of elite Westernized interests down the throats of Africans?
Lastly, and most simply: The Human Rights movement has long had one clear message: Human Dignity. We have proclaimed that rights are not just for the strong, or just for citizens, or just for non-criminals, or just for adults. We have always said that just being human is all one needs to have human dignity and human rights. But no one seriously doubts that the unborn offspring of two humans is also human. So if we endorse a right to abortion, we are saying that merely being human and alive is no longer enough for dignity and rights. We will either have to make a deep change in our self-understanding and abandon our foundation in the dignity of simply being human, or else constantly face the charge of hypocrisy from many opponents and erstwhile supporters—the sort of charge leveled at Thomas Jefferson for proclaiming that all persons “are created equal” while he held onto his slaves.
For the two reasons I have explained above, I believe it to be highly unwise for our Human Rights movement to endorse rights to abortion. Such rights may benefit powerful elites, but they harm many of our most vulnerable sisters in the developing world. And they clash head-on with the internationally recognized human right to life of the fetus, and even with our own foundation in universal human rights.
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For more of our blog posts from Richard Stith, see:
When “Choice” Itself Hurts the Quality of Life
Equal Concern for Each Human Being, Not for Each Human Issue



















